especially on the case law of UK courts in this field. The discussion is divided into three parts, each dealing with a separate type of situation. It first considers the extent to which a European state is obliged to grant asylum to alleged terrorists on the basis that if they were refused asylum they would suffer human rights abuses in the state of which they are a national. It then examines whether, more generally (that is, outside asylum claims), a European state may be obliged not to deport or extradite an alleged terrorist to another state because he or she might suffer an abuse of human rights in that state. Finally, the chapter looks at whether a European state whose security forces are engaged in counter-terrorism activities abroad is obliged to protect the human rights of the individuals serving in those forces and/or the human rights of the alleged terrorists whom the forces are confronting.
While welcoming the extension of state responsibility which is occurring in those types of situation, the chapter notes that it is happening in a way which introduces three aspects of relativity into the protection of human rights, thereby potentially undermining the universalism of the concept. First, European law protects only some human rights extraterritorially. Second, it protects those rights only when there is 'a real risk' of their being violated. Third, in some situations it protects those rights only when there is a real risk of their being violated 'flagrantly'.
THE RIGHT OF TERRORIST SUSPECTS TO BE GRANTED ASYLUM
It must be recalled that not all international human rights documents recognise the right to be granted asylum. While The lex specialis in this area is the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951, as modified by the Additional Protocol of 1967. Article 1A(2) defines a refugee as any person who:
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country… But the Convention goes on to say in Article 1F 17 that it does not apply to:
any person with respect to whom there are serious grounds for considering that:
12 Article 27. 13 Article 14(1) provides: '(1) Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.
(2) This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.' 14 Article 22(7). 15 Article 12(3). 16 Article 18. 17 The provisions mentioned in nn 12-15 above also contain this kind of exception, but not in such detail. Art 18 of the EU Charter cross-refers to the Refugee Convention and Protocol.
(a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity… (b) he has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee; (c) he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
To date, 145 states have ratified the 1951 Convention, including nearly every state in Europe, 18 but not the US. There is no international court focusing on ensuring compliance with the Refugee Convention, so national courts are relatively free to interpret it in their own way. 19 The Convention sets out minimum guarantees: governments may, if they wish, grant asylum in situations where they are not legally obliged to do so under the Convention.
In Europe the Refugee Convention is overlaid with even more specific legal norms. The EU began working towards a Common European Asylum System in 1999, although under the so-called Dublin Convention a common procedure was already in force to allow some EU countries to determine which state should be responsible for examining asylum applications lodged in another EU state. 20 In 26 These documents are all targeted at non-EU nationals (referred to as 'third country nationals'), the presumption being that persecution does not occur within any EU state. 27 The EU's rules on asylum are to some extent a corollary to its rules on the free movement of workers 28 and on the abolition of border controls; 29 indeed the whole EU 'project' is premised on the assumption that EUcitizens should have greater rights than non-EU citizens.
Under the Dublin III Regulation, asylum seekers are supposed to be returned by the EU member state in which the asylum application is made to the EU member state where the applicant first entered the EU, but the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) has confirmed that states cannot simply assume that other EU states will not subject asylum seekers to inhuman or degrading treatment. In NS and ME 30 the CJEU held that under Article 4 of the EU's Charter of Fundamental Rights, which is identical in wording to that of Article 3 of the ECHR, 31 a member state cannot transfer an asylum seeker to the member state where that person first entered the EU if the former member state: cannot be unaware that systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions of asylum seekers in [the latter] Member State amount to substantial grounds for believing that the asylum seeker would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of that provision.
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Moreover, under the Qualification Directive, 33 'third country nationals' (that is, non-EU nationals) are excluded from refugee status if they fall within the categories mentioned in Article 1F of the Refugee Convention, 34 and the Directive slightly broadens the exclusion by making it explicit that 'particularly cruel actions, even if committed with an allegedly political objective, may be classified as serious non-political crime'.
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For its part, the ECHR applies to 'everyone within the…jurisdiction' of any of the 47 member states of the Council of Europe, whatever their nationality.
36 All 28 EU member states are also members of the Council of Europe. Whatever the position under EU law, therefore, a European state's treatment of asylum seekers, whether from EU states or from any other state in the world, can be subjected to scrutiny by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) to see if it breaches Article 3 of the ECHR. The ECtHR has found Greece's asylum procedures to be in violation of Article 3 and has also held Belgium in violation of the same provision for returning an asylum seeker to Greece. 37 Not only were refugees being detained in Greece in inhuman and degrading detention conditions, they were still living in such conditions after being released from detention. More generally, in NA v UK the ECtHR made it clear that an applicant for asylum does not have to show that there are special distinguishing features in his or her case, but only that 'the general situation of violence in the country of destination was of a sufficient level of intensity to create a real risk that any removal to that country would violate Article 3'. 38 If this were not so, the protection offered by Article 3 would be illusory. 40 where the Supreme Court held that it could not be said of Sri Lanka's Tamil Tigers that they were 'predominantly terrorist in character'. This meant that a Tamil Tiger could still be granted asylum in the UK. 41 On the other hand, the Supreme Court has said that the exclusion from refugee status set out in Article 1F(a) of the Refugee Convention should not be limited to situations of 'joint criminal enterprises' but should extend to 'wider concepts of common design, such as the accomplishment of an organisation's purpose by whatever means are necessary including the commission of war crimes'. 42 And in Al-Sirri v Secretary of State for the Home Department the Supreme Court held that the exclusion from refugee status provided for by Article 1F(c) could be triggered by terrorist activity if (as stated in guidelines issued by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees) the activity 'attacks the very basis of the international community's coexistence'.
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The effect of the Refugee Convention, EU law and ECHR law is, therefore, that in Europe non-nationals are protected against the risk of suffering some human rights abuses in their home country. It is the likelihood of these abuses occurring, and their severity, which gives the individual the right to remain in the country of refuge. Within the UK a fear of persecution by criminal gangs will usually not be enough to justify the granting of asylum 44 and applicants can be refused even if this means that, to avoid persecution, they will have to be returned to a part of their home country where they have never previously lived. 45 Moreover, if an asylum seeker has been engaged in what a national judge views as a 'serious political crime' under Article 1F(b) of the Refugee Convention, it will not assist the applicant to claim that this 'crime' was in fact an act of freedom-fighting. 46 Given the 'freedom fighting' that has occurred in places such as Libya, Egypt and Syria in recent years, states wishing to give refuge to any such fighters may have to do so at their discretion, not because they are obliged to do so under supra-national law. Deciding whether to grant refugee status to an asylum seeker is one thing. Deciding what to do with an asylum seeker who has been refused refugee status is another. 47 We should also bear in mind that even if a person has been granted asylum, the Refugee Convention still permits him or her to be deprived of that status at a later stage. Article 32(1) specifically allows this 'on grounds of national security or public order'. However Article 33(1) adds a significant qualification, which is known as the rule of non-refoulement, or non-return, 'No Contracting State shall expel or return a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. ' Note that there is not an exact overlap between this provision and Article 1A(2), in that the former applies even if there is no 'well-founded fear of being persecuted' on the given bases. The prospect of a threat can be enough to trigger the protection. Article 33(1) is also different from the specific European approach, which on the one hand limits nonrefoulement to situations where there is a real risk of harm being suffered but on the other hand extends it to cover harm that takes the form of inhuman or degrading treatment. 48 Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention qualifies the non-refoulement rule in Article 33(1) by providing that:
THE RIGHT OF TERRORIST SUSPECTS NOT TO BE DEPORTED, EXTRADITED OR
The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.
This too is not a replica of Article 1F of the Convention, which governs the denial of refugee status in the first place. Article 33(2) is wider in that it extends to persons who have not been found guilty of any crime, but narrower in that the danger posed by the person must relate to the security or community of the country of refuge. Nevertheless, under the European approach, as we shall now see, such an exception to the rule of non-refoulement does not exist at all, since supranational courts have broadened the rule against non-refoulement so that it applies even in cases where the beneficiary is a danger to the security or community of the country. This is not always a popular stance for courts to take but, to borrow Ronald Dworkin's phrase, it is a consequence of 'taking rights seriously'.
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How the ECtHR has Developed Non-Refoulement
The dilemma facing the UK government in the case of Karamjit Singh Chahal, an Indian Sikh separatist who was living legally in the UK, was that the Home Secretary wished to deport him because his presence was deemed unconducive to the public good 50 but there was a risk that if he was returned to India he would be ill-treated by the police there. The UK government argued that no real risk of ill-treatment had been established but also that, even if it had, the protection afforded by Article 3 of the ECHR should not be regarded as absolute in situations where a state needs to remove a person from its territory on grounds of national security: in such cases the state should be entitled to weigh the likelihood of the asylum 47 seeker being ill-treated abroad against the danger he or she poses to the host nation. But the ECtHR firmly rejected such a proposition. As the ECtHR ruled:
The prohibition provided by Article 3 against ill-treatment is equally absolute in expulsion cases. Thus, whenever substantial grounds have been shown for believing that an individual would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 if removed to another State, the responsibility of the Contracting State to safeguard him or her against such treatment is engaged in the event of expulsion. In these circumstances, the activities of the individual in question, however undesirable or dangerous, cannot be a material consideration. The protection afforded by Article 3 is thus wider than that provided by Articles 32 and 33 of the United Nations 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees...
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The decision of the ECtHR thus overlays the Refugee Convention with an extra stratum of human rights protection, though not one which confers the full protection of the ECHR on all persons who may be liable to expulsion. It singles out Article 3 rights, but only in so far as there are 'substantial grounds for believing' that there is 'a real risk' that a particular individual will be subjected to ill-treatment. 52 Expulsion will not be halted merely because some 'lesser' right, such as the right to free speech or the right to freedom of association, will almost certainly be violated if the person is removed to the state in question. 53 Nor will it be halted if there are merely 'grounds for believing' that there is 'a risk' that ill-treatment will occur. This can be contrasted with the position adopted by the ECtHR in cases where a state is being challenged for not having taken steps to prevent the abuse of children who are within the state. In E v UK, 54 for instance, a violation of Article 3 was found when authorities in the UK failed to notice that a stepfather was abusing his stepchildren. As the Court put it:
Even if the social services were not aware he was inflicting abuse at this time, they should have been aware that the children remained at potential risk. The fact that at the relevant time there was not the knowledge of the prevalence of, and persistence of, sexual offenders victimising children within a family that there exists now, is not significant in this case where, as the applicants emphasise, the social services knew that there had been incidences of sexual abuse resulting in criminal offences and were under an obligation to monitor the offender's conduct in the aftermath of the conviction. While the two situations are not wholly analogous, it is indisputable that in European states Article 3 rights are vindicated more easily when a child is at risk within the state than when an alleged terrorist is at risk outside the state. In other words, even though the ECtHR has interpreted the ECHR in a way which goes beyond the Refugee Convention, it still grants less protection to potential deportees or extraditees than it does to persons who have a right to remain in the state. A degree of relativity has thus been introduced even though Article 3 is meant to confer an absolute right. 56 In a recent inadmissibility decision the European Court held that a suspected terrorist, whom the Court had previously ruled could not be deported to Libya for fear of being ill-treated there, 57 could not complain that the order excluding him from the Netherlands had not been lifted. 58 For states, such as the UK, which do not baulk at extraditing their own nationals, this differential treatment extends even to extradition. Under the Extradition Act 2003 a court must not authorize a person's extradition if it would violate that person's Convention rights. 59 This has not prevented the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights from reporting that the provisions in question 'do not, in practice, offer adequate human rights protection for those subject to proceedings', because 'the courts have set their interpretation of the threshold for extradition to be refused on human rights grounds too high'. 60 In Babar Ahmad v UK the ECtHR held that it would not breach the human rights of the radical cleric Abu Hamza, or those of other applicants, to extradite them to the US where they were at risk of being imprisoned in a 'supermax' prison and held in solitary confinement. 61 As Mavronicola and Messineo have pointed out, 62 this decision calls into question the commitment of the ECtHR to the absoluteness of the right not to be subjected to ill-treatment.
Memoranda of Understanding
After the bombs in London on 7/7 2005, when the government was planning how to take more effective counter-terrorism measures, Prime Minister Tony Blair cited Chahal v UK as an obstacle which needed to be overcome:
[W]e are today signalling a new approach to deportation orders. Let no one be in any doubt. The rules of the game are changing…Up to now, the concern has been that orders for deportation will be struck down as contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR as interpreted by the European Court in the Chahal case in 1996....However, the circumstances of our national security have now self-evidently changed and we believe we can get the necessary assurances from the countries to which we will return the deportees, against their being subject to torture or ill-treatment contrary to Article 3. 63 The legality of these 'diplomatic assurances', or Memoranda of Understanding, has been considered both in domestic courts and in Strasbourg, one of the leading cases being 56 On relativity within art 3 case law more generally, see Michael Addo and Nicholas Grief, 'Does Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights enshrine absolute rights? (1998) 9 EJIL 510. 57 that which involved the radical Islamic cleric Abu Qatada. 64 The House of Lords ruled unanimously that the Memorandum which had been agreed with the Jordanian government (whereby if Abu Qatada were returned to Jordan the authorities there would ensure that he would not be ill-treated) was enough to satisfy the ECHR. They applied the test which they had developed in R (Ullah) v Special Adjudicator, 65 namely that the violation of any right other than those conferred by Articles 2 and 3 would need to be serious, flagrant, gross or fundamental. 66 As Lord Phillips, the President of the Supreme Court, put it:
Before the deportation of an alien will be capable of violating Article 6 there must be substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk (i) that there will be a fundamental breach of the principles of a fair trial guaranteed by Article 6 and (ii) that this failure will lead to a miscarriage of justice that itself constitutes a flagrant violation of the victim's fundamental rights. 67 The House of Lords was genuinely trying to predict what the ECtHR would say about such a Memorandum based on that Court's own previous pronouncements, but it failed to anticipate the new stand about to be embraced by the ECtHR. When the case reached Strasbourg the seven judges agreed with the Law Lords' approach to what constitutes a 'flagrant denial of justice' but differed from them as regards the test to be applied when determining the risk of such a violation occurring. The House of Lords had held that the applicant needed to prove on a balance of probabilities that torture-tainted evidence would be admitted at his trial in Jordan, 68 whereas the ECtHR held that the applicant merely had to adduce evidence capable of proving that there were grounds for believing that he would be exposed to 'a real risk' of such evidence being admitted (for example, through someone else having been tortured). 69 This was the first time the ECtHR had held that an applicant's Article 6 rights would be violated if he or she were removed to a country outside Europe. Later the British Home Secretary was able to renegotiate the Memorandum with Jordan in a way which satisfied even Abu Qatada himself: he agreed to be deported 70 rather than continue his fight through the British and European courts. In 2014 Abu Qatada was acquitted by a court in Jordan and released from custody.
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The net result, again, is that the ECtHR is prepared to protect some but not all of the Convention rights of terrorist suspects. Moreover, when considering potential violations of the right to fair trial outside Europe they are prepared to protect defendants only against 'fundamental' or 'flagrant' violations. The ECtHR has not specified what would amount to a less serious and therefore ignorable violation. This is another blow to the universal character of human rights, but we should not be too surprised at the willingness of the ECtHR to adopt a relativist approach. It lives in the world of Realpolitik and is conscious of the need to respect long-established principles of public international law which have not yet been infiltrated by IHRL. This was made obvious in the Court's recent judgment in Jones v UK 72 where, by six to one, a Chamber held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity still trumps the Article 6 right of access to justice in situations where victims of torture wish to sue a foreign state or its officials in respect of their ill-treatment. Thus, while Europe will not remove a person to any country where evidence derived from torture might be used in court as evidence against that person, it will not insist on a victim of torture being allowed to claim compensation within Europe from the authorities of a non-European state in which he or she was tortured. The concept of an effective remedy, guaranteed by Article 13 of the ECHR, still plays second fiddle to the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
THE DUTIES AND RIGHTS OF SECURITY FORCES ENGAGED IN COUNTER-TERRORISM OPERATIONS ABROAD
As already alluded to, Article 1 of the ECHR requires each of the 47 member states of the Council of Europe to secure the Convention rights of 'everyone within their jurisdiction'. The beneficiaries do not need to be nationals of those states. If the Convention rights of a nonnational are not protected to the same extent as those of a national, the non-national can potentially claim that his or her right to freedom from discrimination has been violated: Article 14 lists 'national or social origin' as well as 'association with a national minority' as prohibited bases for discriminating between people in the enjoyment of their rights.
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In recent years the ECtHR has developed its jurisprudence on what 'within their jurisdiction' means in Article 1. The effect has been to expand the applicability of the Convention overseas. As a result of the ECtHR's judgments in cases such as Bankovic v Belgium 74 and Al-Skeini v UK, 75 the Convention allows victims of ill-treatment, or the families of victims who have been killed, to seek redress against Council of Europe states which are in 'effective control' of the territory in which the ill-treatment or death occurred. We have learned that such control can exist not only over a consulate or a detention centre but over an entire region of a foreign country. As the Grand Chamber put it in Al-Skeini:
The obligation to secure, in [an area under effective control], the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention, derives from the fact of such control, whether it be exercised directly, through the Contracting state's own armed forces, or through a subordinate local administration….The fact that the local administration survives as a result of the contracting state's military and other support entails that state's responsibility for its policies and actions. The controlling state has the responsibility under Article 1 to secure, within the area under its control, the entire range of substantive rights set out in the Convention and those additional Protocols which it has ratified. It will be liable for any violations of those rights. 77 However, in extending the extra-territoriality of the ECHR the Court in Al-Skeini departed from the approach it had adopted in Bankovic regarding the set of rights which must be protected if the ECHR is to be applied extra-territorially. In Bankovic the Grand Chamber preferred an all-or-nothing approach: the ECHR could not be 'divided and tailored'. 78 But in Al-Skeini the Grand Chamber said:
It is clear that, whenever the State, through its agents, exercises control and authority over an individual, and thus jurisdiction, the State is under an obligation under Article 1 to secure to that individual the rights and freedoms under Section I of the Convention that are relevant to the situation of that individual. In this sense, therefore, the Convention rights can be "divided and tailored". 79 The ECtHR has not yet gone so far as to hold that members of a state's armed forces can themselves claim the protection of the ECHR when they are engaged in military operations abroad. This was also the view of the UK Supreme Court in R (Smith) v Oxfordshire Assistant Deputy Coroner, 80 where the mother of a soldier who had died of heatstroke while serving at a British military base in Iraq was able to persuade only three of the nine Supreme Court justices who heard her appeal that her son was within the jurisdiction of the UK at the time of his death. However in a later case, involving a different family named Smith, as well as other families, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously that at the time of their deaths, when they were blown up by improvised explosive devices while travelling in Land Rovers in Iraq, two British soldiers were within the UK's jurisdiction for the purposes of the ECHR. 81 The Supreme Court went on to hold by four-to-three that the claims that not enough had been done to protect the soldiers should not be struck out on the ground that they were not within the scope of Article 2 of the Convention. 82 It is surely only a matter of time before the ECtHR will have to rule on whether a state's soldiers have rights under the ECHR even when they are in the theatre of war.
The immediate question which these developments raise is whether IHRL is beginning to displace IHL in this context. 83 The Al-Skeini case related to operations in Iraq. Even though the operations occurred after the fall of the Sadaam regime, they were events within an international armed conflict because occupying coalition forces were still fighting armed insurgents. Arguably, the Geneva Conventions on the laws of war should have applied as the lex specialis. Yet the ECtHR was content to apply IHRL in addition to IHL. While most human rights activists would doubtless applaud the usurpation of IHL by IHRL in this context (and perhaps in others), because for the most part the latter's protections are more protective than the former's, we are surely entitled to know exactly when and to what extent IHRL applies. To date the ECtHR has been singularly uninformative on that front. This lack of clarity persists even though the Court has very recently had an opportunity to state more precisely how the ECHR interacts with IHL during international armed conflicts, especially in the context of the right to liberty under Article 5 of the ECHR. In Hassan v UK, 84 which concerned the detention of a man in Iraq by UK forces, the ECtHR had to consider whether Article 5(1) should be interpreted as being impliedly qualified by the broader detention powers granted to states under the Third 85 and Fourth 86 Geneva Conventions. Holding that it should, the Court added that the right to habeas corpus conferred by Article 5(4) of the ECHR could be supplanted by the forms of review provided for under the Fourth Geneva Convention. 87 While there are positive dimensions to this judgment, it leaves many questions unanswered. 88 
CONCLUSION
In various situations EU law and ECHR law have been striving to extend the obligations on European states to protect suspected terrorists against human rights violations in countries outside Europe. First, in the context of claims for asylum the CJEU and the ECtHR have superimposed obligations already established by the Refugee Convention of 1951. They have done this not so much by adopting a new definition of persecution, the key term within the Refugee Convention, but by accepting that asylum seekers must not be sent back to states where they are at real risk of suffering death, ill-treatment or loss of liberty. However, real risks of other human rights violations will not prevent the denial of asylum. Secondly, and relatedly, in situations where a state is considering whether to deport or extradite a person (whether or not he or she is an asylum-seeker), the two European courts have made it abundantly clear that the principle of non-refoulement enshrined in Article 32 of the Refugee Convention, and qualified by Article 33 of the same Convention, has been supplemented by the principle that no one can be removed to a jurisdiction where there is a real risk that he or she might be killed, inhumanely or degradingly treated or arbitrarily deprived of liberty. This is laudable, but it does tend to confirm the hierarchy of rights which is apparent in the context of asylum claims. The ECtHR will prevent deportation or extradition in instances where other rights might be violated only if there is a real risk of a 'flagrant' or 'fundamental' violation of the right in question. Thirdly, the ECtHR has recently significantly expanded the espace européen by holding that member states of the Council of Europe take the ECHR with them when they exercise effective control of a person or a location in another state. This has meant that individuals living in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan have been able to rely upon the ECHR when European troops have violated their rights there. Again, though, it is only some violations which qualify for this protection: the ECtHR has accepted the reality that temporary control over an individual does not usually lend itself to full and faithful implementation of the whole of the ECHR. This is appropriate, for the perfect should not be the enemy of the good. It is likely that similar protection will soon be accorded by the ECtHR to members of the security forces of European nations when they are operating extraterritorially.
Europe is therefore protecting people more than ever against violations of their rights which might occur in other states, including states which are not members of the Council of Europe. But it is doing so in a selective manner and a by-product of the approach may be an impression that some people deserve greater protection of their human rights than others. Any such impression is a reflection of the fact that we live in a world of nation states, where there is only so much that one state can do to prevent human rights violations occurring in another state. Just because all human rights cannot be protected does not mean that none should be. Accusations of double standards are accordingly unjustified. The primary onus is on the governments of states where violations of rights occur to both prevent them and remedy them.
